Both scientific evidence and folklore have suggested that madness is associated with creativity, especially in the arts. Recently, more rigorous studies have confirmed to some extent these previous observations. The current view is that it is not severe and acute insanity that is related to heightened creativity, but the personality roots and soft manifestations of both schizophrenic and bipolar psychoses. The affective and cognitive peculiarities associated with schizotypic and hypomanic personalities may be preferentially related to different kinds of creative endeavours, (...) such as the sciences and arts, respectively. The connection between personality traits and creativity is produced because they share some biological-cognitive-personality features, such as cognitive disinhibition. Additionally, it has been shown that the genetic liability for both bipolar and schizophrenic psychoses is related to creativity. A prevailing hypothesis is that creativity may be one type of 'compensatory advantage' for those carrying the genes for psychosis. (shrink)

In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes explains several observable phenomena showing that they are caused by special arrangements of unobservable microparticles. Despite these microparticles being unobservable, many passages suggest that he was very confident that these explanations were correct. In other passages, however, Descartes points out that these explanations merely hold the status of “suppositions” or “conjectures” that could be wrong. My main goal in this chapter is to clarify this apparent conflict. I argue first that for Descartes it was (...) indeed possible to have knowledge of unobservable particles and structures, and that the possibility of natural explanations being wrong should be understood as these explanations not being absolutely certain, but only morally certain. I use the debate in contemporary philosophy of science between scientific realism and antirealism as a framework to understand how Cartesian explanations work. Especifically, I argue that Cartesian explanations rely on what Ernan McMullin calls retroduction, which is a mode of inference that justifies beliefs in concrete unobservable entities and processes, based on considerations such as simplicity, coherence, etc. This kind of justification is of common use among scientific realists. Thus, another goal of this chapter is to highlight the relevance of Descartes’ ideas about explanation in the contemporary debate on scientific realism. (shrink)

"A theoretical juice extractor: The role of mathematics in scientific explanation". There have recently been proposed cases where, supposedly, mathematics would play a genuinely explanatory role in science. These have been divided into those situations where the explanatory role would be played by mathematical operations, and those where it would be played by mathematical entities. In this article, I analyze some of these purported cases and argue that claims that mathematics can be genuinely explanatory are unfounded. Throughout my discussion, I (...) emphasize the representational role of mathematics, as opposed to its supposed explanatory role: the role of mathematics, even in the cases that I discuss, is to represent physical facts and help draw inferences about those facts. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this with the (...) bridges of Königsberg case. -/- . (shrink)

The Enhanced Indispensability Argument appeals to the existence of Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena to justify mathematical Platonism, following the principle of Inference to the Best Explanation. In this paper, I examine one example of a MEPP—the explanation of the 13-year and 17-year life cycle of magicicadas—and argue that this case cannot be used defend the EIA. I then generalize my analysis of the cicada case to other MEPPs, and show that these explanations rely on what I will call ‘optimal (...) representations’, which are representations that capture all that is relevant to explain a physical phenomenon at a specified level of description. In the end, because the role of mathematics in MEPPs is ultimately representational, they cannot be used to support mathematical Platonism. I finish the paper by addressing the claim, advanced by many EIA defendants, that quantification over mathematical objects results in explanations that have more theoretical virtues, especially that they are more general and modally stronger than alternative explanations. I will show that the EIA cannot be successfully defended by appealing to these notions. (shrink)

The bridges of Königsberg case has been widely cited in recent philosophical discussions on scientific explanation as a potential example of a structural explanation of a physical phenomenon. However, when discussing this case, different authors have focused on two different versions, depending on what they take the explanandum to be. In one version, the explanandum is the _failure_ of a given individual in performing an Eulerian walk over the bridge system. In the other version, the explanandum is the _impossibility_ of (...) performing an Eulerian walk over the bridges. The goal of this paper is to show that only the latter version amounts to a real case of a structural explanation. I will also suggest how to fix the first version, and show how my remarks apply to other purported cases of structural explanations. (shrink)

: C.S. Peirce defines mathematics in two ways: first as "the science which draws necessary conclusions," and second as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.227–244). Given the dual definition, Peirce notes, a question arises: Should we exclude the work of poietic hypothesis-making from the domain of pure mathematical reasoning? (CP 4.238). This paper examines Peirce's answer to the question. Some commentators hold that for Peirce the framing of mathematical hypotheses requires poietic genius but (...) is not scientific work. I propose, to the contrary, that although Peirce occasionally seems to exclude the poietic creation of hypotheses altogether from pure mathematical reasoning, Peirce's position is rather that the creation of mathematical hypotheses is poietic, but it is not merely poietic, and accordingly, that hypothesis-framing is part of mathematical reasoning that involves an element of poiesis but is not merely poietic either. Scientific considerations also inhere in the process of hypothesis-making, without excluding the poietic element. In the end, I propose that hypothesis-making in mathematics stands between artistic and scientific poietic creativity with respect to imaginative freedom from logical and actual constraints upon reasoning. (shrink)

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's and Benbaji's interpretations of Reid's (...) views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation. (shrink)

“Structuralism, Fictionalism, and the Applicability of Mathematics in Science”. This article has two objectives. The first one is to review some of the most important questions in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics: What is the nature of mathematical objects? How do we acquire knowledge about these objects? Should mathematical statements be interpreted differently than ordinary ones? And, finally, how can we explain the applicability of mathematics in science? The debate that guides these reflections is the one between mathematical realism and (...) anti-realism. On the other hand, the second objective is to discuss the arguments that use the applicability of mathematics in science to justify mathematical realism, and show that none of them reaches its aim. To this end, we will distinguish three aspects of the problem of the applicability of mathematics: the utility of mathematics in science, the unexpected utility of some mathematical theories, and the apparent indispensability of mathematics in our best scientific theories - in particular, in our best scientific explanations. Finally, I argue that none of these aspects constitutes a reason to adopt mathematical realism. (shrink)

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peireean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peireean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In (...) particular, I claim that Peireean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton's thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference. (shrink)

From our deep interest in the neuroconstructivist framework, we would like to comment on two fundamental aspects of Mareschal et al.'s work: the role of neuroconstructivism for clinical work with people suffering from developmental disorders; and the relation between the process of progressive specialization and the increasing abstraction of representations in development.

Understanding positive emotions' shared and differentiating features can yield valuable insight into the structure of positive emotion space and identify emotion states, or aspects of emotion states, that are most relevant for particular psychological processes and outcomes. We report two studies that examined core relational themes (Study 1) and expressive displays (Study 2) for eight positive emotion constructs—amusement, awe, contentment, gratitude, interest, joy, love, and pride. Across studies, all eight emotions shared one quality: high positive valence. Distinctive core relational theme (...) and expressive display patterns were found for four emotions—amusement, awe, interest, and pride. Gratitude was associated with a distinct core relational theme but not an expressive display. Joy and love were each associated with a distinct expressive display but their core relational themes also characterised pride and gratitude, respectively. Contentment was associated with a distinct expressive display but not a core relational theme. The implications of this work for the study of positive emotion are discussed. (shrink)

This book seeks to arrive at a better understanding of the relationships between the objective and subjective aspects of time. It discusses the existence of fluent time, a controversial concept in many areas, from philosophy to physics. Fluent time is understood as directional time with a past, a present and a future. We experience fluent time in our lives and we adopt a temporal perspective in our ways of knowing and acting. Nevertheless, the existence of fluent time has been debated (...) for both philosophical and scientific reasons, thus creating a rift between the subjective and objective aspects of time. Starting from the basic notion of points of view, or perspectives, this book explores the relationships between objective or external time, as it has been conceptualized by science, and subjective or internal time, which is involved in our lived experiences. It establishes a general framework encompassing the nature, structure and mode of existence of points of view, in which the objective and subjective aspects of time can be integrated. The book mainly addresses researchers and postgraduates in philosophy and logic. Additionally, it offers inspiration for physicists and computer scientists involved in the modeling and simulation of complex behaviors for which the representation of internal time should be considered together with the notion of objective, external time. (shrink)

El pensamiento metafísico es factor de equilibrio ontológico para el hombre, pues él busca, dentro de sí mismo, un ser absoluto que sea su causa, así como también causa de todos los seres. La “muerte” de la metafísica de la causalidad, con Kant, propició la transferencia de este Absoluto a una obligación moral, cuya legisladora sería una buena voluntad subjetiva, introduciendo el relativismo en el pensamiento humano y generando, a lo largo del tiempo, una crisis ético antropológica y la pérdida (...) de la auténtica trascendencia. ¿Sería el rescate de la metafísica una respuesta transcendental a la crisis del hombre contemporáneo? (shrink)

Time has a highly unstable place between the objective and the subjective. On the one side, there are very well known philosophical arguments trying to show that time has only a subjective reality, even that it is merely a subjective epiphenomenon. On the other side, we are compelled to take points of view as non dispensable elements of reality, at least of a reality capable of containing beings like us. And points of view offer a world of temporal entities existing (...) in an objective way. Moreover, points of view themselves appear to be temporal entities among other temporal entities. We analyse both aspects of time. Our main focus will be McTaggart’s arguments against the reality of a fluent time, what he called temporal series of kind A. We will distinguish three very different arguments in McTaggart works. We analyse them in detail. And we reject their conclusive character. Our final target is to maintain that there is a room for fluent time in what is internal to points of view but external to the subjects adopting those points of view. (shrink)

This book seeks to arrive at a better understanding of the relationships between the objective and subjective aspects of time. It discusses the existence of fluent time, a controversial concept in many areas, from philosophy to physics. Fluent time is understood as directional time with a past, a present and a future. We experience fluent time in our lives and we adopt a temporal perspective in our ways of knowing and acting. Nevertheless, the existence of fluent time has been debated (...) for both philosophical and scientific reasons, thus creating a rift between the subjective and objective aspects of time. Starting from the basic notion of points of view, or perspectives, this book explores the relationships between objective or external time, as it has been conceptualized by science, and subjective or internal time, which is involved in our lived experiences. It establishes a general framework encompassing the nature, structure and mode of existence of points of view, in which the objective and subjective aspects of time can be integrated. The book mainly addresses researchers and postgraduates in philosophy and logic. Additionally, it offers inspiration for physicists and computer scientists involved in the modeling and simulation of complex behaviors for which the representation of internal time should be considered together with the notion of objective, external time. (shrink)

Se presenta una reflexión reposada y en tono más bien familiar y desde la perspectiva de la epistemología axiológica acerca de las enseñanzas que elZeitgeist, o espíritu de los tiempos intenta insuflar en la comunidad académica y en la sociedad total, a raíz de los dos años y más de la pandemia del Covid-19 que ha padecido gran parte de la humanidad. Tales enseñanzas no solo pueden, sino que, además, deben marcar el derrotero para la construcción y promoción de nuevas (...) y reinventadas formas de sentido común. Para ello, la propuesta del viraje o transformación epistémica, tanto desde la dimensión meramente informativa, como de la funcional del conocimiento hacia el ámbito de lo axiológico, se presenta como la atención a un reclamo impostergable del viviente humano contemporáneo, urgido de articular su doble acceso al conocimiento, aquel que le es relativo a su subsistencia y el que le permite situarse en lo profundo de la existencia misma para integrar desde allí todo lo que en él converge. (shrink)

According to Petersen, ‘the individualization argument against NMEF [nonmedical egg freezing]’ states: ‘it is morally wrong to let individuals use technology X [NMEF] – in order to try to handle a problem that is social in nature – if the use of X [NMEF] will somehow work against a social solution to a social problem P [gender inequality in the labor market]’. While there may be individuals making individualisation argument against NMEF, I do not read the scholars he discusses—Karey Harwood,1 (...) 2 Lynn Morgan, Janelle Taylor3 and Angel Petrapanagos4—as making this argument. These scholars agree with the premise of the individualisation argument that NMEF ‘is an individualistic and morally problematic solution to the social problems that women face’, but this does not mean that they agree with the conclusion ‘women should not use NMEF’. In fact, several admit that NMEF can be a good choice for some women; Petropanagos, for example, states ‘individual women may benefit from egg freezing to satisfy their reproductive desires’.4 In this commentary, I argue that Petersen incorrectly reduces these scholars’ positions to the individualisation argument by neglecting three pertinent factors: their feminist orientation, their multifaceted critiques of NMEF and how the rapidly advancing field of reproductive medicine informs their ethical analysis. While Petersen …. (shrink)

We show a sentence and modal square of opposition and equivalence to be expanded into an hexagon according to oe suggestion from William of Sherwood. This expansión is permittedby two sentence and modal rules.The logical relations of the square allow us to formulate several theorems in order to show a glimpse of the Medieval Logic complexity.

In Jurismania, Paul Campos asserts that our legal system is beginning to exhibit symptoms of serious mental illness. Trials and appeals that stretch out for years and cost millions, 100 page appellate court opinions, 1,000 page statutes before which even lawyers tremble with fear, and a public that grows more litigious every day all testify to a judicial overkill that borders on obsessive-compulsive disorder. Campos locates the source of such madness, paradoxically, in our worship of reason and the (...) resulting belief that all problems are amenable to legal solutions. In insightful discussions of a wide range of cases, from NCAA regulations of student-athletes to the Simpson trial, from our most intractable social disputes over abortion and physician-assisted suicide to the war on drugs and the increasingly fastidious attempts to regulate behavior in public spaces, Campos shows that the mania for more law exacerbates the very problems it seeks to remedy. In his final chapter, the author calls instead for a humbling recognition of the limits of reason and a much more modest role for our legal system. Clearly written and laced with a delicious wit, Jurismania gives us a CAT-scan of the American legal mind at work. It reveals not only that the patient is even worse off than we imagined, but also clarifies the many reasons why. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the temporal structures that are appropriate to study the notion of point of view. When we analyze the points of view and their structure, it seems clear that we must take into account the time t in which a point of view is attributed to a subject. A two-dimensional temporal logic which combines a modal dimension for possibilities and a temporal one for the flow of time, offers a clear view of the temporary location of (...) a point of view. In this logic, we have histories, thanks to the temporal dimension, and evaluation is in two indices, time and history. These stories can be seen as different scenarios, providing a clear advantage when applying to the analysis of the notion of point of view. The conclusion is that, in order to give a proper approach for the notion of point of view, all these aspects should be combined. (shrink)

Emotion regulation is one of the major foci of study in the fields of emotion and emotional development. This article proposes that to properly study emotion regulation, one must consider not only an intrapersonal view of emotion, but a relational one as well. Defining properties of intrapersonal and relational approaches are spelled out, and implications drawn for how emotion regulation is conceptualized, how studies are designed, how findings are interpreted, and how generalizations are drawn. Most research to date has been (...) conducted from an intrapersonal perspective, and the shortcomings of this approach for understanding emotion regulation are highlighted. The article emphasizes major conceptual and methodological steps required for a fuller description of the process of emotion regulation. (shrink)

En este trabajo ofrecemos un panorama al estudio de los sesgos. El creciente interés en ellos durante las últimas décadas radica en que estudiarlos implica hablar de cómo los seres humanos razonamos y emitimos juicios, e igualmente sobre los mecanismos y procesos que subyacen a tales capacidades, esto incluye entender cuándo y por qué frecuentemente nos equivocamos, como lo indica buena parte de la literatura en psicología cognitiva del razonamiento. Dada la existencia de los sesgos, han surgido posturas pesimistas que (...) sostienen que los sesgos muestran que los humanos son irracionales. Frente a estas, la literatura reciente ofrece visiones mas optimistas, y aduce que los sesgos pueden “desaparecer” si se tienen en consideración diferentes aspectos de tipo evolutivo. Otra postura es aquella que sostienen que la supervivencia humana no yace en la inteligencia individual sino en la colectiva. Es decir, que podemos dejar de confiar exclusivamente en el contenido de nuestra mente y en su lugar resolver los problemas colectivamente, gracias a la división de las tareas cognitivas. Para organizar la exposición dividimos el trabajo en tres enigmas de los sesgos cognitivos. El primero consiste en una discusión sobre el origen de los sesgos. El segundo concierne a su clasificación e inventarios. El tercer enigma versa sobre la unidad de análisis de la cognición humana, a saber, inteligencia individual versus inteligencia colectiva. Con estos enigmas queremos poner de manifiesto el abanico de discusiones que giran alrededor de los sesgos, sus problemas, así como la creciente fascinación por entenderlos. Estudiar los sesgos abona a la comprensión de cómo razonamos o pensamos, y esto nos ayuda a mejorar nuestro pensamiento crítico. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma resposta a dois problemas presentes na teoria cartesiana da liberdade tal como é desenvolvida nos Princípios da Filosofia. O primeiro refere-se às diferenças entre a versão latina e a tradução francesa dos Princípios no que concerne à definição de liberdade. O segundo refere-se à controvérsia, existente no contexto da literatura secundária, sobre se a teoria cartesiana da liberdade desenvolvida nos Princípios seria distinta daquela desenvolvida nas Meditações Metafísicas. Como pano de fundo desta discussão (...) encontra-se um problema clássico, a saber, o problema da relação entre o que parecem ser duas concepções de liberdade: liberdade como livre-arbítrio e liberdade como espontaneidade. Tendo em vista esse problema, é nossa pretensão também responder, sobre como, precisamente, deveríamos compreender a relação entre essas duas concepções na teoria da liberdade desenvolvida por Descartes nos Princípios. (shrink)

O “paradoxo da liberdade” consiste em esta só poder ser atingida através da obediência, a qual é vista frequentemente como o contrário da liberdade. Neste artigo, demonstrar-se-á que o paradoxo começa por nascer em Maquiavel, o qual, porém, deixa-o em aberto ao colocar a liberdade tão-só dentro de um contexto de governação. Spinoza, contudo, dará um passo em frente na sua abordagem à liberdade política. Ele aborda esta problemática diretamente nos seus dois tratados políticos e ambos expressam o mesmo entendimento (...) da liberdade, embora através de diferentes instâncias terminológicas. A solução spinozana combina um conjunto de critérios variados para a determinação da liberdade política, tanto da perspectiva do indivíduo como da perspectiva do Estado. Todavia, a sua combinação não é simples cumulação, mas sim uma complexa escala permitindo medir a liberdade em graus. Dessa maneira, Spinoza consegue fazer com que diferentes tipos de liberdade se compatibilizem com diferentes tipos de obediência. (shrink)

Na Modernidade filosófica, a expressão sui iuris torna-se comum nos textos políticos, em especial a partir do momento em que uma linguagem dos direitos subjectivos naturais se vai sedimentando e traduzindo uma certa perspectiva da liberdade individual. Assim, sui iuris é considerada expressão de direito designando um âmbito de autonomia ou independência individuais, uma espécie de espaço soberano de um direito pessoal. Em Spinoza, o sui iuris surge com frequência, mas só no Tratado Político atinge a sua máxima expressão, dentro (...) do binómio sui iuris / alterius iuris, o qual é habitualmente identificado com um de autonomia / heteronomia. Tentar-se-á aqui demonstrar que o sui iuris em Spinoza passa por uma transformação radical: não só não é necessariamente incompatível com o alterius iuris, como é-lhe dada uma dimensão epistemológica que se coaduna com uma soteriologia. O sui iuris é então mais uma libertação. (shrink)

From the scene of the singing cicadas in the _Phaedrus_, we will show the affinities between the mention of the dangerous sleep at noon (_Phdr_. 258e6-259d8) and a mythical episode in the life of Epimenides. Next, we will look at the possible affinities between the description of Dionysian madness (_Phdr_. 244d5-245a1) and the type of divination practiced by Epimenides of Crete (DK 3 B 1-25). From these approaches, we intend to describe and elucidate the common imaginary with which Plato elaborates (...) his reception and assimilation of the archaic poetic tradition in his philosophy. (shrink)

En el capítulo I titulado "Del origen de los indios de Chile y de las noticias que acerca de él se han conservado", el jesuita Diego de Rosales propone una lectura de los mitos indígenas a partir de su vinculación con la tradición judeocristiana. Este hecho, además de rescatar una parte de la cultura oral mapuche, demuestra la vigencia del proyecto evangelizador iniciado por el padre Luis de Valdivia. El artículo analiza la relación entre la escritura de los mitos indígenas (...) y el programa misional jesuita. Planteo que el rescate de las creencias nativas fue un medio para desestabilizar la legitimidad del discurso esclavista y para justificar una forma distinta de imponer las prácticas de sujeción colonial a partir de la idea de continuidad entre ambas culturas. (shrink)